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Fur Seal Convention of July, 1911); and the establishment of direct agencies 
such as the International Joint Commission and the Canadian War Mission. 
(After all, both Resolution IX and the Imperial War Cabinet withered away 
with the coming of peace.) But despite these and other slight differences of 
interpretation, the reviewer regards Wigley's work as one of the finest to be 
found in commonwealth historical literature. 
ALVIN C. GLUEK. JR. 
Recent Controversies in Canadian Business History 
In the last few years the literature on Canadian business history has been 
immeasurably enriched by a number of important and controversial books. 
Among the most significant is a recent study by Michael Bliss in the Canadian 
Social History Series. In his A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History 
of Canadian Business. 1883 - 1911 (Toronto, McClelland & Stewart. 1974). 
Professor Bliss argues that there was among Canadian businessmen at the 
turn of the twentieth century almost a mystique of public service, a belief 
that they were performing vital services for the nation. They saw their in-
terests as synonymous with the prosperity of Canada in this period of economic 
growth. Pursuing only "a living profit", by which they meant a reasonable and 
modest return on their capital, businessmen felt themselves besieged by 
rapacious trade unionists and undermined by an indifferent federal govern-
ment, business competition, and declining public belief in the virtues of free 
enterprise, hard work and thrift. Bliss draws impressively from a number of 
major Canadian business papers to explain the collective viewpoint of the 
merchants, manufacturers, bankers, railwaymen and shipowners, large and 
small, from Halifax to Vancouver on issues such as the tariffs and unions. 
While the author examines the narrow, self-contradictory, and sometimes 
ridiculous nature of the business outlook, he concludes by emphasizing the 
important point that, despite these shortcomings, the opinions of business-
men must be taken by historians as seriously as the views of contemporary 
politicians, labour leaders, clergymen, university professors, social critics 
or anyone else. Businessmen meant. Bliss reminds us. exactly what they said. 
Professor Bliss has provided us with an important, provocative and ex-
ceptionally well-written book. But while he defends his thesis with vigour and 
persuasiveness, one has difficulty in accepting all his arguments. Among the 
weaknesses of his case is the establishment of an extremely broad category of 
businessmen which seems to include anyone, anywhere who buys, sells or 
trades in anything. But this seems a strangely naive position for an historian. 
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Despite what the contemporary journals might r.;ive suggested, would the 
Winnipeg grocer necessarily have the same outloo*. on the tariff or on trade 
unions as the Montreal cotton manufacturer or railway tycoon? Aside from 
their subscribing to the same general goal of making profits — as much as 
possible, one suspects — there were probably more factors dividing them than 
bringing them together. The bitter opposition of westerners and Maritimers 
to what they regarded as extortionate freight rates and tariffs makes it diffi-
cult to discuss them and railwaymen except as adversaries. Bliss admits this 
fact in several places: yet he is so intent on establishing their common in-
terests that he seems oblivious to glaring weaknesses in the argument that 
they were all virtually the same in outlook. Relying for his evidence almost 
entirely on the testimony of the business press, Bliss insists that we are ob-
ligated to believe that these statements, rather than what we know of the 
actual performance of some businessmen, truly represent the Weltanschauung 
of Canadian businessmen. Maybe it is a fact that most businessmen gained 
only "a living profit" and that the grasping and slick promoters, contractors, 
real estate promoters, and monopolists in all fields were the anomalies. 
But this would be difficult to prove without a number of detailed studies of 
several key sectors of the Canadian economy during the period 1883 - 1911. 
To believe that Canadian businessmen would be satisfied with only a "living 
profit" on the basis of what the business press tells us requires a leap of faith 
that few will be willing to make. One pictures W. C. Van Home and T. 
Shaugnessy seated in the deep comfort of Montreal's St. James' Club having 
a quiet chuckle as they read editorials in the Monetary Times telling its 
readers that all businessmen want are modest profits. Some smaller business-
men might well have been satisfied with only modest returns, but Bliss' 
failure to distinguish between categories of businessmen and his failure to 
suggest that at least some of their behaviour in business affairs indicates dis-
crepancies between what they (or their publicists) said and what they did, is 
highly unfortunate. 
No such naïveté characterizes the writing of Tom Naylor who, in his re-
markable two volume The History of Canadian Business (Toronto, James 
Lorimer, 1975), shows that our businessmen included a substantial number of 
aggressive, imaginative and unscrupulous entrepreneurs in all fields. In read-
ing this almost overpoweringly detailed study we encounter a veritable 
demonology of the business world with an immense list of bankers, insurance, 
railway and manufacturing companies and their owners who have plundered 
stockholders and the public purse of millions. Although in some respects 
reminiscent of muckraking literature, Naylor's work is much more than an 
entertaining extension of Gustavus Myers' History of Canadian Wealth 
(Toronto, J. Lewis and Samuel, 1972V, recently reprinted with an introduction 
by Stanley Ryerson, a book that exposed the depredations of railwaymen, 
manufacturers, and landgrabbers up to the 1890s. Naylor's is one of the first 
Acadiensis 135 
attempts to provide a systematic analysis of Canadian economic history be-
tween Confederation and World War I in order to elucidate "the roots of 
contemporary economic structures". 
Naylor argues that during the nineteenth century the Canadian manufac-
turing sector did not grow to the extent that it could have, mainly because the 
nation's banks did not invest in it. Canadian bankers concentrated on ex-
tending short-term commercial and New York call loans, discounting com-
mercial paper.and investing in elements of the Canadian and U.S. commercial 
infrastructure such as railways. Starved for funds. Canadian manufacturers 
consequently had to remain small and technologically dependent on Britain 
and the United States. With the establishment of national policy tariffs. 
Canadian industrial life began to flourish. But harrassed by Canadian and 
American patent laws, and starved for development funds, these relatively 
small scale native Canadian manufacturers were overwhelmed and replaced 
during the late nineteenth century by a tide of American industrialists who 
established new plants in the Montreal-Toronto St. Lawrence corridor. 
However, a small segment of the Canadian commercial class which had been 
previously indifferent or hostile to investment in manufacturing, while con-
tinuing to hold fast to commercial activity, also began to put money into 
factories which they recognized as economically profitable now that they had 
the benefit of high protection afforded by the 1879 tariffs. In certain sectors. 
such as cotton textile plants and sugar refineries. Naylor points out that 
Canadian investment was massive. The Canadian economy between 1867 
and 1914. therefore, continued as essentially staple-based with the old 
Montreal and Toronto commercial elites in control of most of the nation's 
banking, insurance and finance structure, as well as exercising a dominant role 
in key sectors of its new manufacturing enterprises. 
Closely controlled by a narrow commercially-oriented group which also 
dominated the interlocking trust and insurance companies, the banks* 
policies were detrimental to the development of a more diversified, and what 
Naylor regards as a healthier, Canadian economy. They drained funds from 
needy areas such as rural Ontario and the Maritimes to invest in the develop-
ment of the Prairie's wheat economy, thus both weakening the ability of the 
eastern farmers to change and accelerating the dangerous dependence in 
the West — and by implication the entire Canadian economy — on one crop 
whose price was ultimately determined in an international market. Thus 
Canada was still in the "staple trap" during the pre-World War I period and 
was saddled with an overinvestment in backward linkages such as railways as 
well as an overexpanded industrial capacity — much of it American con-
trolled — which suffered periodic stoppages and retrenchment, with the 
accompanying dislocation and misery. It is a fascinating and in some ways 
compelling thesis. But the book has many of the weaknesses of an intuitive 
work in an area where most of the basic research has yet to be done. 
136 Acadiensis 
The fundamental problem with Naylor's work is that many of his major 
assertions are not proven. For example, his principal point about chartered 
bank reluctance to invest in industry is open to serious question even on the 
basis of existing evidence. That the banks generally refrained from purchasing 
securities of manufacturing industries is easily established, but some indus-
trialists received accommodation from the banks in the form of long-term 
loans (or short-term loans that were regularly renewed), as working capital. 
A careful study of bank records (of which very few are yet open to scrutiny) 
would establish how important and extensive these loans were to Canadian 
manufacturing firms during this period, and there is already intriguing evi-
dence to suggest it was very substantial indeed. On this issue Naylor's case 
is open to doubt; at the very least, it is unproven. Beyond this, however, is 
the seriously flawed assumption — running through Naylor's work — that 
nascent industrialists were crying out for more capital. But where is the 
evidence that they were.1 If the late nineteenth century was the seed-time of 
Canada's industrial development — a dubious assertion that Naylor repeats 
numerous times — it was also true that the corporate form in industry was 
rare. Unincorporated companies did not issue publicly marketable securities 
and it might have been extremely difficult for banks or other financial 
institutions to invest in industries except through loans. Moreover. Naylor's 
contention that merchants were overtly opposed to industrial development 
is also open to serious doubt. In an important article, Larry MacDonald has 
pointed out that at least one "'backward linkage", the railway — whose de-
velopment the merchants always keenly supported — must be considered an 
industry.2 It is also clear that certain key industries such as the manufacture 
of ready-made clothing in Montreal were promoted by merchants who took 
advantage of opportunities created by high protective tariffs, nationwide 
transportation facilities, large markets, and cheap immigrant labour. 
One unsubstantiated or erroneous assertion follows another in Naylor's 
catalogue of iniquities perpetrated by the Canadian mercantile elite on the 
economy. Land monopolization — some 3½ million acres of unimproved 
land held by absentee landlords in the Canadas — in 1860 led to agricultural 
unrest and a drain of population to the United States (I, p. 31). Only after 
Confederation did a protectionist lobby develop in Canada (I, p. 30). (A 
strong protectionist group, led by merchant William Workman, arose in 
1 This point is developed in D. McCalla, "Tom Naylor's A History of Canadian Business, 
1867-1914: A Comment", Historical Papers. 1976, pp. 249 - 54. 
2 L. MacDonald. "Merchants Against Industry: An Idea and its Origins", Canadian Historical 
Review, LVI (1975). pp. 263 - 8 1 . 
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Montreal as early as 1849 and the 1858 Galt-Cayley tariffs were decidedly 
protectionist.) The Grand Trunk was "deliberately mismanaged by its 
Canadian board and illegal and ruinously expensive arrangements with other 
Canadian companies were undertaken" (I, pp. 25 - 6). Québécois industrial 
entrepreneurs — with no examples provided — were submerged "under a 
wave of anglo-controlled mergers" (I, p. 15). At some unexplained point 
between 1867 and 1914 there was in Canada an "overexpansion of trunk 
lines [which] took precedence over local lines for the development of a 
Canadian market for local industry" (I, p. 15). (Since the 1870s the densely 
settled portions of Ontario and Quebec were criss-crossed by local railways. 
In any case it is doubtful if these rather than tariffs had much to do with the 
expansion or contraction of the domestic market for Canadian-made manu-
factures.) "Business fixed capital formation was not undertaken in anticipa-
tion of a boom in wheat exports that occurred nearly a decade later" (I, p. 11), 
the author asserts, leaving us wondering just what the C.P.R. and the Cana-
dian Northern promoters thought they were doing if not building their lines 
in anticipation of the wheat boom. In a number of places, Naylor states that 
Ontario and the Maritimes agricultural areas were drained of funds by the 
banks to invest in the West; but this unsubstantiated argument seems to con-
tradict later statements which point to improved conditions in Ontario 
mixed farming during the same period (I, p. 205). Even if funds were being 
moved from the Maritimes to other areas, this is not evidence that the banks 
were doing anything more than responding to what they perceived as more 
profitable opportunities elsewhere. A statement that around the mid-1830s 
there was a shift of "Canadian public debt from the province to England in 
order to free funds in Canada for other investments" (I, p. 21) leaves one 
baffled. To free what funds? Borrowings were made in England before Con-
federation to build a transportation infrastructure which the Canadian 
government by itself could not finance. For what other investments? The 
government revenue was not invested and a major proportion was absorbed 
by amortization payments on loans. Or is Naylor trying to suggest that the 
Canadian public debt before 1835 was in private hands and that shifting the 
debt to England freed this Canadian private capital. If so, it is an important 
new finding which he should have documented. 
On and on the litany of unproven or weakly substantiated charges roll 
from Naylor's vitriolic pen. By denying them credit the Bank of Montreal 
destroyed Ontario's two largest banks, he writes (I, p. 68). Destroyed? Not 
really. The Commercial Bank of the Midland District, according to a recent 
essay by the late Max Magill.3 made bad investments in Michigan railroad 
3 Max Magill, "The Failure of the Commercial Bank", in G. Tulchinsky, ed., To Preserve 
and Defend-Essays on Kingston in the Nineteenth Century (Montreal, 1976), pp. 169 - 81. 
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securities and the Bank of Montreal's E. H. King not only refrained from 
bailing out its Ontario rival but also later picked up some of its pieces. This 
was a tough and mercenary attitude, to be sure, but that, after all. is business. 
The Commerciars directors, not the Bank of Montreal, must bear prime 
responsibility for the failure. Later, we are told that most country and small 
urban merchants were tied to one big wholesale firm, but no reference is 
provided. Moreover, this statement is seemingly inconsistent with a subse-
quent assertion that there were hordes of commercial travellers canvassing 
the country stores for business; if true, this suggests that metropolitan whole-
salers did not feel all that secure about the allegiance of upcountry retailers. 
Country merchants failed frequently, Nayior asserts, and to trick metro-
politan wholesalers into extending more credit, they would start up again 
under the wife's name. Maybe some did, but how general was this kind of 
deception. Does it stand to reason that any but the most stupid wholesaler — 
all of whom had access to the amazingly thorough Dun and Bradstreet re-
ports on businessmen large and small most everywhere — would fall for 
tricks like that? 
Distortion and innuendo also permeate much of the book. Systematic 
fraud. Nayior writes, was practised by a handful of land speculators and 
Hudson's Bay Company officials to pry land scrip from the Manitoba métis 
after 1870 (I. p. 174; II, p. 5). Not only is Giraud's Le métis Canadien: son 
role dans l'histoire des provinces de l'ouest (Paris, 1945) — the standard 
work on the subject — not even referred to. but there is nowhere any evi-
dence of an organized plot by a small group to filch land from the poor métis. 
who sold most of their scrip for pittances to a large number of people. In an 
attempt to demonstrate the power of Eastern financial institutions on the 
Prairies during the Laurier boom as compared to the financial independence 
of American farmers in nearby states, Nayior points out that by 1913 eighty 
per cent of Saskatchewan farms were mortgaged whereas only forty-five 
per cent of farms were mortgaged in seven American prairie states immediate-
ly to the south (I, p. 208). But this is like comparing apples with oranges; 
these U.S. states — which the author does not identify — were settled long 
before Saskatchewan. Wheat farmers in the Dakotas had had at least a 
generation to pay mortgages by 1913. A'more suitable comparison for Nayior 
would have been Saskatchewan in 1913 with North Dakota in 1890. 
Devastating epithets and one-liners — with no evidence to back them up — 
abound. Financiers E. S. Cox and J. B. Yates were "numbers racketeers" 
(I, pp. 21. 246); utilities companies "extorted" from customers; funds were 
"embezzled from the Northern Railway in 1869 and 1872" (I, p. 262). A verit-
able demonlike horde of Canadian financiers seem to have raced through the 
country stealing, extorting, embezzling, cheating, lying and bribing. The 
reader's mind boggles. Moreover, Professor Nayior also reads his history 
backwards. Problems such as the American takeover of many key sectors 
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in the Canadian economy now become transposed back to the 1867 - 1914 
period and we are made to see the past through the present. Perhaps the worst 
of all the weaknesses in this book is that we are presented with a rigid analysis 
which allows no significant exceptions to the categorization of historical 
developments that will prove the continuous operation of Naylor's underlying 
assumptions. To business historians who have attempted to study Canadian 
business behaviour in an objective manner, Naylor's sweeping treatment and 
rigid analytical structure (with its cavalier or polemical style, irresponsible 
use of evidence, inadequate research, simplistic comparisons, and cheap 
epithets) comes as an unpleasant shock. Yet, despite these shortcomings, 
Naylor's book is, in its broad scope and rich detail, an impressive and im-
portant contribution; to many it provides a welcome counterpoise to at-
tempts to make national heroes out of our businessmen. A veritable storm of 
reviews of the History of Canadian Business and Naylor's replies in the Leftist 
press and elsewhere suggest that a lengthy controversy is in store. 
Yet, despite their shortcomings and the controversy that each for different 
reasons has aroused, the works by Bliss and Naylor have important and 
lasting value to Canadian historians. These books have already stimulated a 
lively and useful debate that may last for many years. Not only is the debate 
interesting in itself — the tortuous ideological haggling amongst Canadian 
Marxist historians has a fascination all its own — but it may prompt historians 
to undertake research into some of the significant questions which the dis-
cussion raises about Canadian economic development before 1914. To what 
extent did Canadian financial institutions help to underwrite the country's 
industrial development? What was the extent of American ownership of 
Canadian manufacturing capacity in specific industries? How high were 
profits in industry, finance, transportation and other sectors, and to what 
extent was manufacturing made more profitable by the national policy tariffs. 
More detailed studies of small and large businesses and businessmen — 
studies like Ted Regehr's admirable The Canadian Northern Railway: 
Pioneer Road of the Prairies, 1895 - 1918 (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 
1976) and Viv Neiles' scholarly, careful and well-written The Politics of 
Development; Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849 • 
1941 (Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1974) — will reveal the extent to which 
they responded to or were affected by government policies whether national 
or provincial, or how closely the rise and fall of their fortunes conformed 
to fluctuations in the business cycle. Yet the broad, daring works of thesis and 
overview, whatever their shortcomings, have as much value in this search as 
the impeccably careful and admirable works of more limited horizons. 
Students of Canadian economic and business history have in the Bliss and 
Naylor works a lot to chew on, much to inspire, inform and debate. 
G. TULCHINSKY 
